British occupation of the Faroe Islands, 1940-1945

On the 11 April 1940 Lieutenant Colonel Sandall, Royal Marines, was presented with an envelope marked MOST SECRET. What was contained inside came from the highest levels of Government. He was to embark HMS Suffolk with a formidable force of Royal Marines and make his way to the port of Tórshavn in the Danish governed archipelago of the Faroe Islands and report immediately to the HM Consul.

While being far from an act of aggression, the Governor of the Faroe Islands, Prefect Mr. Hilbert, had agreed to “afford to HM Government any facilities necessary to prevent the Germans from establishing themselves in those Islands.” Within 2 days the 200¹Some reports stated 250 Marines, but archive documents show just less than 200 were sent. Marines of Force Sandall had landed on the remote North Atlantic islands and Operation VALENTINE was in full swing.

Context

The first half of 1940 was formational in the stance both Britain and Germany would take in the coming years. It would be another month before Churchill was Prime Minister on 10 May; the British Expeditionary Force were engaged in the Battle of Dunkirk still unaware an evacuation would be initiated on the 25 May; and other than the expansion of the R.A.F. and introducing Air Raid Precautions (A.R.P.), Britain hadn’t yet started the massive defensive project that would ultimately see the construction of thousands of pillboxes and defences. But, on the 9 April 1940, German forces crossed the border into Denmark and within 6 hours the country had capitulated. The following day Norway surrendered after sporadic but hearty resistance. With the Gemrans now in control of deep water fjords only 300 miles away from Scapa Flow, the home of the Royal Navy’s Home Fleet, Britain was panicked about the possibility of German dominance in the North Atlantic, and the Faroe Islands came into focus. By 1940 the Navy had already suffered embarrassment by the sinking of the Royal Oak in the supposedly safe waters of Scapa Flow a year earlier, they had to take every precaution to prevent this from happening again.

As an interesting side note, in a German report from Admiral Raeder to Hitler, given on 9 March 1940, it was clear that the Kriegsmarine had concerns that should their continued harassment of the British Home Fleet at Scapa Flow continue that they “may subsequently withdraw to the Faroes.” This was notably a month before the British themselves appeared to recognise the value of the islands but may have assisted the Germans who were planning the occupation of Norway under Operation Weserübung and would have enjoyed greater freedoms should the British fleet be further away.

Why the Faroes?

Only 230 miles from Scapa Flow, the Faroe Islands were a territory of Denmark. With the sudden occupation of Denmark by Germany, Britain was concerned that the Islands could be used not only to mount attacks on the British Isles and intensify submarine warfare on trans-Atlantic shipping. Despite their weaker Navy, the Germans would be closer to controlling the North Atlantic and restrict the freedom of movement of the Home Fleet effectively confining them to port. They were already expanding use of submarine warfare, including in the sinking of the Royal Oak. The importance of Greenland-Iceland-UK gap was also now recognised as key to restricting the German Navy’s freedom to operate from its home ports, and the occupation of the Faroe Islands was the first step in Britain and her allies closing this GIUK gap. Iceland was occupied by Britain in May 1940, and the United States took over control of Greenland shortly after.

The occupation

HMS Suffolk, flanked by two destroyers HMS Hesperus and her sister ship HMS Havant, made steam for Tórshavn arriving at 14:00 on 12 April 1940. The occupation force had sailed, a new chapter in history had begun.

The deployment of Force Sandall on Operational VALENTINE was an incredible demonstration of reactionary British expeditionary capabilities. However, committing the force to the defence of the Faroes withdrew what was then the Royal Marine reserve force from being able to support the Home Fleet elsewhere. This is precicesly the purpose of the Royal Marines, under the control o fthe Admiralty for the protection of Naval forces while at anchorage. Immediate plans were put in place to relieve them at the soonest opportunity. Less than a month later on 1 May 1940, the Army would send a relieving force of Lovat Scouts, a territorial Regiment from the highlands of Scotland.

The occupation was peaceful with the support and backing of the Faroese Governor at the time. In fact, the initial landing party did not carry weapons as a token of their peaceful intentions towards the locals. But the marines did have to be equipped to repel any subsequent attempts by German forces to take the Islands; at least until a defence plan and reinforcements could be deployed. So the initial force would be armed. Each man carried 70 rounds of ammunition per rifle and 50 rounds per revolver. Lewis guns would have 2,000 rounds allocated to them with 200 rounds per rifle in reserve. As the force was to prepare defensive positions, 25 picks and 50 shovels were also loaded.

The next ship to be dispatched to Faroe was H.M.S. Guardian, from Rosyth, on 16 April. She would be loaded with two 3.7” field howitzers and 200 rounds of ammunition, net defences to protect the entrance to Skålefjord, and the R.A.F. with an R.D.F. station in the form of a No. 2 Transportable Radio Unit using Light Warning Sets. Also on this ship was Captain W.R.D. Crowther, the newly appointed Naval Officer in Command (N.O.I.C.) Faroes who would soon to take up appointment as Fortress Commander.

Equipping a force for the defence of the islands would not be easy. The primary focus was that of coastal defence, so trained gunners would be needed along with appropriate coastal guns. The 3.7” howitzers sent on Suffolk were small mountain guns and wholly unsuitable for coast defence. So long as Suffolk and her escorts remained, their artillery and anti-aircraft defences would be utilised. I have not established if the howitzers ever landed, but they are likely to have been deployed in the hills surrounding the anchorage at Tórshavn to provide some light bombardment of the town should the enemy attempt a landing of their own. We should remember that the landing force was not in isolation, they had the support of both air and artillery defences of any naval ship that lay at anchor in the bay, as well as maritime air patrols flown by aircraft from Northern Ireland and Scotland.

Scrambling to load up the S.S. Mashora at Scapa Flow, the War Department dispatched further defensive supplies to leave on 22 April 1940. Attempts were made to source equipment for one battery of three 6” guns, two batteries of two 4” guns, and six defence electric lights, but it appears these efforts failed.

It was nearly five months after the occupation that four 5.5 Coast defence guns were in action, and six to seven months after the occupation that Bofors anti-aircraft guns arrived for Tórshavn and Skålefjord. No heavy anti-aircraft guns have been sent here, and none have ever been required up to August 1942. (Vágar and the aerodrome are being considered separately).

Faroe Islands: General Report – 1942 (National Archives ADM 116-5334 accessed from nielsjuel.fo)

Coast artillery

The initial landing of troops included a detachment of Marines from the Coast Defence Brigade, were intended to man the battery of 6” guns for which attempts were being made to deploy soon after the Force Sandall had arrived. The gunners were fresh out of training; in fact, it is reported that their coast defence gunnery training had only started less than 2 weeks prior on 1 April 1940. The planned coast defences would consist of a three-gun 6” battery and two two-gun 4” batteries. This plan was never deployed, instead a combination of 5.5-inch and 12-pounder guns would defend the shores of the Faroes.

The purpose of the coast artillery in the defence of the Faroe Islands was the seaward defence of Tórshavn Harbour, Skålefjord naval anchorage and Vágar seaplane base. This was achieved through the construction of five batteries:

• Skanse close defence Battery in Tórshavn, armed with two 5.5” naval guns and two 90 cm 3°defence electric lights.
• Naes close defence Battery to the east of the entrance to Skálafjørður was also armed with two 5.5” naval guns and two 90 cm 3° defence electric lights.
• Strendur anti motor torpedo boat (MTB) Battery to the west of the entrance to Skala Fjord, armed with two 12-pounder guns and two 16° moving lights. The decision to mount the guns here was taken in August 1940 after it was found that the only suitable location for the 5.5-inch guns wasn’t suitable for close defence of the Skålefjord narrows.
• Giljanes multi-role anti-MTB, anti-submarine and AA defence Battery to the north of the harbour entrance in Midvaag was armed with two 12-pounders on high-angle low-angle (HA/LA) Mk. IX mounts, two 90 cm 3° moving lights and two fixed 30° lights. The HA/LA mounts allowed these guns to be fired up to 70° elevation against aircraft.
• Bour multi-role anti-MTB, anti-submarine and AA defence Battery was on the northern approach to Sørvágur harbour and armed with two HA/LA 12-pounder Mk. IX guns, two 90 cm 3° moving lights, one fixed 30° light and one 16° fixed light to assist anti-aircraft firing to sea.

Each 5.5-inch battery had 50 rounds of Common Pointed Ballistic Cap (CPBC) and 50 rounds of high-explosive (HE) ammunition in ready use lockers, while the 12-pounder batteries had a total of 100 rounds each. A further 700 rounds were stored in magazines within each fort.

The effectiveness of coastal defence relies on early warning, and as the occupation developed this was achieved through two surface watching radar stations at Eiði and Sydero. Two indicator nets had also been laid across the entrance to Skålefjord, the escort refuelling base. A system of naval patrols, coast watchers and observation from the signal stations at Nolso and Volbostad also contributed to the early warning and identification of hostile vessels. According to orders, local battery commanders were prepared to fire independently on targets within 6,000 yards range that appeared to be acting in a hostile manner.

The forts at Skanse and Naes operated an examination service for the port and refuelling anchorage.

As the situation in Europe was changing and the effectiveness of the German navy had been depleted a slow drawdown of defences was initiated in the Faroes. First to close February 1944 were the 12-pounder batteries at Giljanes and Bour, along with the 5.5-inch guns of Naes battery.

Skanse Battery was operated by 240 Coast Battery Royal Artillery until 14 March 1945 when it was taken over by the Composite Coast Battery, Faroe Islands Force. Similarly, Strendur Battery transferred from 249 Coast Battery R.A. to the new Composite Battery. A new state of readiness was introduced for coast batteries in 1945, dropping to a single gun maintained at immediate readiness, the second guns to be manned only on the communication of a stand-to order. Air defence of the batteries was now also dropped to two Bofors guns each.

Air Defence

Operating at the limit of their range, German aircraft frequently bombed and machine-gunned targets on the Faroes. Most attacks were carried out by Ju. 88 twin-engine aircraft. With an increasing strategic importance for the British forces, plans to expand the air defences of the Islands constantly evolved throughout the 5 years of occupation, and so did the attention paid by the enemy.

Radio Direction Finding

Early air defence plans called for a network of seven Air Ministry Experimental Station (A.M.E.S.) Radio Direction Finding (R.D.F.) or radar stations (although the term RADAR wasn’t adopted from the Americans until 1943). It had been recognised that the conventional Chain Home stations would not be suitable due to the size of antennas required. Each of the proposed A.M.E.S. stations would, because of the geography of the country, be required to be constructed on seven different islands. They would provide a comprehensive early warning shield of around 30 miles, just long enough to sound the alarm and man the anti-aircraft guns. The logistical challenge of this would have been too great, so a reduced network of only four stations would go on to be constructed.

In a series of 1942 operational documents relating to the air defence of the Faeroes detailed the requirements for the comprehensive defence of the islands from air attack. Much like the lessons learned from the Dowding system of ground-controlled air defence deployed across the skies of the U.K. the Faroes would work a layered approach:

• Four Radio Direction Finding (R.D.F.) stations of A.M.E.S. No. 6 Light Warning Sets would be based at Nolso (east), Akraberg (south), Eiði (north) and Mykinnes (west) would provide early warning to the A.A. defences as well as air raid warning and interception capabilities for fighter aircraft. These stations would give all-round cover to the islands out to 50 miles in favourable conditions, the reality being much less than this.
• A Gun Operations Room (G.O.R.) would be established.
• A system of observers would report directly to the G.O.R. in Tórshavn.
• 8 heavy and 28 light anti-aircraft guns would protect critical sites around the new airfield, the unloading pier at Vágar, the naval anchorage and capital at Tórshavn, the naval refuelling anchorage at Skålefjord, and the town at Klaksvig.
• Ground defence for each of the R.D.F. stations would be provided by the War Office, comprising 2 twin-A.A. machine guns, a ground machine gun, 6 machine carbines and 75 grenades each.

Eiði was a joint air and surface watching station and was equipped with two R.D.F. sets; an A.M.E.S. No. 6 Light Warning Set, and a Naval 273S set with a range of 10-25 miles. 

It also appears that a fifth R.D.F. station was constructed at Sandur on the island of Sandoy. However, it’s likely that due to poor performance it was closed soon after. In the station log book for R.A.F. Vaagar it was logged that Sand R.D.F. station was the first to pass plots of a ship on 22 August 1942, with Akraberg following on 24 August with an aircraft plotted from Akraberg the following day. Nolso R.D.F. station was then next to be commissioned on 30 August 1942 plotting a passing aircraft.

Communication between the R.D.F. stations and the would be via radio telegraph (voice) link, with a high-frequency (H.F.) wireless telegraphy (morse) link between Faroes and the filter room at Lerwick in Shetland. H.F. and V.H.F. radio stations would also be established to enable communication and coordination between ground stations and aircraft.

As well as the network of R.D.F. stations, a V.H.F. D/F fixing service was proposed of three stations; Eiði, Nolsoy and Vágar. There was also an allocation of two frequencies for a Darky network, and M.F. beacons at Vágar, Mykinnes and Nosloy.

With the closedown and withdrawl of troops from the Faroes in 1945, the radar station at Borðan on Nólsoy was the last to remain operational.

AA gunnery

Air defence is very much a layered approach; first is the early detection and identification of approaching aircraft, next come the RAF fighter squadrons for airborne interception, then is the close air defence role fulfilled by heavy anti-aircraft artillery and 40mm light anti-aircraft guns, before the passive air defence (P.A.D.) measures of air raid precautions (A.R.P.). Contemporary assessments established that the Faroes were out of the range of fighter aircraft, and as such the R.A.F. chose not to deploy their own fighters to the Faroes. Mid-range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft such as the Ju. 88 could reach the islands, and there was also the remote possibility of aircraft launched from the German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin; which due to the efforts of the Royal Navy never materialised. 

By December 1940, Bofors saw action at Tórshavn and Skålefjord with additional guns being emplaced at Klaksvig and Tversa in 1941 as German attention towards the islands increased. The decision to send further Bofors guns to the Faroes was taken in June 1941 when the Admiralty notified the N.O.I.C. Faroes that twelve would be dispatched. But for nearly the first two years of occupation the only British deterrents were a few Bofors 40mm light-A.A. guns and intermittent fighter patrols flying from RAF Sumburgh in the Shetlands.

As well as the dispersed Bofors emplacements, each coastal battery was equipped with four or six (in the case of Naes Battery) anti-aircraft light-machine guns for their own close air defence. The ability to deter and fight back and enemy aircraft would rely on the permanent presence of an R.A.F. fighter squadron, but this would require an airfield.

Fighter interception

The start of construction on the airfield at Vágar saw an immense increase in the personnel and resources being allocated to the Faroes, and in a review of the air defences a total of twenty-eight Bofors and eight 3.7-inch heavy anti-aircraft guns would be dispersed around strategic areas on the islands:

Location	H.A.A.	L.A.A.
Aerodrome	4 (these would be withdrawn after completion of the airfield)	4
Flying boat base	The HAA battery above served both the flying boat base and the airfield.	4
Unloading piers at Sorvagur and Midvagur		8
Tórshavn city and naval anchorage	4	6
Skålefjord anchorage and refuelling depot		4
Klaksvig town		2

Without sufficient and experienced manning, the anti-aircraft defences were redundant. With the N.O.I.C. Faroes responsible for air defences, he reported in March 1941 that the infantry was unable to man the A.A. guns, and while crews from coast defence artillery batteries were able to man the anti-aircraft batteries this would weaken the integrity of the coastal defences. The guns had previously been manned by personnel from the Royal Navy but these men were recalled to their respective ships leaving the air defences dangerously manned. An urgent request was placed to London for the despatch of light A.A. troops from the Royal Artillery to operate the guns. 

The largest anti-aircraft battery, which still exists today, was constructed between July and November 1942 on the banks of the Sørvágsvatn lake. Named Chester Camp after the hometown of the first occupants, it was armed with four 3.7-inch guns in concrete emplacements, with a central command building and associated barracks for the gunners. The battery was operational throughout 1943 and was finally decommissioned in February 1944.

There were also four Naval 2-pounder Vickers guns deployed to the islands, but these were not recorded under the weapons available for anti-aircraft defence. They are noted in a record of troop disposition and were deployed in pairs at Skala opposite the Naval fuel storage depot and Solmundar-Fjorvur on the opposite banks of the anchorage. They bolstered the protection to vulnerable ships onboarding or offloading fuel. These guns were Vickers Mk. VIII 2-pounders, known as the Pom-Pom, they were outdated by the 1940s, but still deployed in huge numbers. 

The two Bofors at Klaaksvik and one gun at Tverra were decommissioned in February 1944.

Airfield and flying boat base

On the 8 October 1941 a decision was made to proceed with the construction of an airfield on the Faroes, this was 18 months after the initial landings of Force Sandall. The primary aim was to provide air defence for the islands above what was currently in force in the form of a few light-anti aircraft guns. Runways of 800 feet were accepted as the shortest possible to facilitate refuelling of Fleet Air Arm (F.A.A.) and general reconnaissance aircraft, as well as enabling the use of the airfield as an advanced operating base for fighter aircraft. It seems that soon after the design stage the intention to permanently accommodate flying units on the islands diminished. Long range fighters would fly from bases in the Shetlands, and if or when short-range fighter cover was required, Fighter Command would despatch a Squadron for that purpose. 

The War Department’s initial reconnaissance of the Islands failed to identify any specific sites suitable for an aerodrome. However, in December 1941 a party of Officer’s from R.A.F. Coastal Command identified suitable locations for the establishment of an airfield and a flying boat base and their conclusions were slightly more positive.

The were a lot of considerations to consider when constructing an airfield here; the presence of a harbour to import personnel and materials, the suitability of roads, space for two runways ideally perpendicular to each other, locations for aircraft dispersal, locations for technical and domestic accommodation, telephone communications, height above sea-level, and the nature of flying approaches to the runways. The length and width of the runways would also dictate the size and capability of the aircraft that could operate from the airfield. 

Two options were available to the War Department; the first option explored was to construct a two-runway airfield on the island of Sandoy, on the flat region around the village of Sand. This was primarily discounted after engineers visited due to the lack of suitable harbour facilities for landing equipment and materials. If this option had been accepted, all materials would have been landed by flat bottomed landing craft on the beach. The second option was on the island of Vágar. While it was acknowledged that more construction work would be required to prepare the ground, this could be done almost continuously due to the superior, virtually all-weather harbour at Sørvágurur, and a second harbour at Midvagur. 

Despite this, the Aerodrome Board initially recommended in February 1942 that Sandoy Island was most suitable for the construction of the new airfield. A large workforce of 2,300 British workers would be required, supplemented by 1,000 local Faroese men, and 17,000 tons of material from the U.K. It was estimated that to proceed with this location, it would take 2 years to construct suitable harbour facilities even before material and machinery could be landed for the aerodrome construction. Suddenly the Vágar site became feasible once again; harbour facilities and roads already existed, as did a 3.5-mile-long lake for flying boats to operate from. It seemed that by March 1942 the War Office had changed their minds – Vágar was to be the location of a combined aerodrome and flying boat base.

Initial designs were for a permanent aerodrome with two runways at 90 degrees to each other enabling landing in all wind directions, and a flying boat base with nine hardstanding bays. But not long after work had started the War Office decided that the aerodrome would assume the role of an advanced base and not be fully operational. The second runway was scrapped, and the flying boat base was reduced to five bays. But the single runway would be at the expense of being able to operate single-engine fighters that could give protection against attacks on the flying-boat base or naval anchorage. However, long range fighters could operate from the new runway facilities with ease, offering a refuelling base for shipping protection patrols and ferry flights between Iceland and the U.K. 

The paradox with aerodrome construction is that before the benefits of enhanced air protection can be experienced, local air defences needed to be increased. What would be an asset to the British occupying force, could also become an asset for an invading German force. And given the complexities the terrain in the Faroes caused, and the dominance of the Royal Navy in the North Atlantic at the time, an airborne invasion of the Faroes by the Germans was most likely. A contemporary assessment predicted that a medium scale air attack could be launched from German bases in Norway.

The influx of construction personnel began in February 1942 when engineers from the Pioneer Corps arrived to start construction, followed soon after by Royal Engineers and large numbers of soldiers for the defence of the new site. The lack of facilities on Vágar meant that local billeting was less of an option, so new accommodation on a vast scale was constructed. 

However, by 27 April 1942, likely prompted by the Air Ministry’s confirmation that no permanent Fighter Command squadron would be based from Vágar, the air defence responsibility for the Islands passed enitrely to Coastal Command who had already been operating the flying boat base. 

The aerodrome, known formally as Royal Air Force Station, Vágar, Faroe Islands, opened on 8 June 1942, and by the following month 22 Officers and 200 NCOs and airmen had been posted to the station. By July 1940 an additional 4 Officers and 44 airmen had been posted to support the expanding and remote R.D.F. stations in the Faroes, under the badge of 71 Wing, No. 60 Group. January 1943 saw the R.A.F. establishment rise to 570 personnel. This was in addition to the army of construction personnel.

The main camp supporting the airfield was above Sørvágur, on what appears to have been a green-field area called Uppi á Mýrum. As well as containing mostly Nissen hutted accommodation for nearly 3,000 men, all the additional facilities for such a large community were also included; canteens, recreation facilities, medical blocks and all the ancillary supporting functions had to be catered for too. While the barracks themselves have since been demolished, many of their concrete bases can be seen, as can some seemingly random gable walls and other infrastructure such as pipes and water tanks. 

One of the first facilities to be completed at the airfield site was on the 6 September 1942 when the sick quarters was opened in a 16-foot Nissen hut. It had expanded to two huts by the end of the year. There was a crash room, crash ward, treatment room, consulting office, store, dispensary and dental centre. This operated as No. 4 Field Hospital from October 1942 until June 1945 when the airfield had all but closed. No. 9 Field Hospital in Torshavn had been disbanded in February 1944 after transferring to the Military Hospital, Faroe Islands.

An additional camp was constructed in the village of Vatsnoyrar to the east of the airfield. A small settlement existed on the site before the occupation, but residents were relocated during the operation of the camp to elsewhere on the islands. The camps proximity to the Sjatlá River caused problems when damage and disruption was caused when the river overflowed, and reports of winter ice flows destroying barracks may have come from this camp. 

Flying boats of Coastal Command had been operating from the Faroes for a while before, on 1 August 1942 the first landplane flight in the Faroes was achieved; not from the airfield, but a Miles Magister, tail number L088, that took off from the beach at Sørvágurur, about 1.5 km west of the airfield. It would be the following year, on 14 June 1943 when the first operational aircraft would land on the runway at Vágar; a Lockheed Hudson, tail number F/279.

Along with facilities for flying seaplanes and fighters, the Faroes required communications infrastructure to support operations. During August 1942 an H.F. D/F. station was tested and commissioned with the assistance of two Catalina’s from Lough Erne used to help calibrate the equipment.

Despite the effort given to the construction of the airfield, less than 3 years after the decision was taken to construct it, on 22 March 1944, information was received from HQ 18 Group that RAF Station Vágar was to begin closing and returning personnel and equipment to the U.K. By the end of the month radar equipment had been returned from Mykinnes, the H.F. D/F station had closed, as had the M.F. and responder beacons. Although in a partial reprieve these capabilities reopened from Vágar the following month. Midvaag transmitting station closed permanently on 22 May 1944.

In total, 2,000 tons of equipment were returned to the U.K. in April 1944, and by the end of June only 248 RAF personnel remained. The station was reduced to care and maintenance on 10 July, and full closure on 29 July. Not much over a year since the first aircraft landed. The last entry in the R.A.F. Vágar Operations Record Book was written on 1 September 1944.

Despite the closures and withdrawal of the R.A.F., 1 NCO and 11 airmen of Nolsoy radar station and 1 NCO and 6 airmen of Vágar M/F beacon would remain on the islands, with administrative control passing to the Navy in August.

LORAN

In 1943, when the military force was already preparing to evacuate the islands, a request was received for the siting of a LORAN navigation station on the Faroes. Pragmatism suggested this would be constructed near the existing concentration of facilities, either on Vágar or near Tórshavn, but neither were deemed suitable. LORAN or Long-Range Navigation was an American invention of the Second World War, much like the British GEE system, initially intended for naval navigation but later adapted for air navigation.  It was a high-frequency (HF) radio system consisting of a “chain” of land-based transmitters. The other two stations were in Iceland and on Stornoway. The most suitable location for the middle transmitter in this chain was on the southern Faroese island of Sydero. Four antennas, two technical and one domestic buildings were constructed, along with an anti-aircraft emplacement. It was manned by R.A.F. personnel. Much of this site, minus the antennas, remains and can be visited.

Naval anchorage

North of Tórshavn was Skálafjørður; a large natural harbour identified as having great strategic importance for the Royal Navy. One of the first tasks to protect the fjord was the construction of a 5.5-inch battery at Naes and a 12-pounder battery at Strendur. During the early days of occupation during Operation Valentine and before departing Faroes, H.M.S. Guardian had been tasked with laying a type B1 indicator net defence to protect against fast moving Motor Torpedo Boats. A dedicated boom trawler was subsequently dispatched to the Faroes to operate the boom.

The main use of the now well protected fjord was the refuelling of escort vessels. While this was originally done from a tanker, the admiralty erected four large fuel tanks at Søldarfjørður. Completed in September 1943 they were welded steel construction, encased in concrete for protection against attack. The tanks were still in use 82 years later.

Having learned a difficult lesson after the sinking of the Royal Oak in Scapa Flow in 1939, the British took no chances in protecting approaches to the Faroes and six naval minefields were laid; north of Eysturoy, between Stremoy and Sandoy, south of Suduroy and three minefields between Sandoy and Streymoy. As well as successfully deterring German naval vessels, the minefields caused the deaths of many Faroese fishermen when their boats struck them and curious civilians when mines washed ashore. 

Land defence

Almost as soon as the Marines of Force Sandall had landed, plans were made to relieve them with a battalion from the army. A telegraph sent by the Admiralty to the Officer Commanding Royal Marines (Faroes) on 18 April, read:

Intend to relieve your force by Army. Object is to hold Cable Station, Tórshavn and Skålefjord against possible enemy landing not exceeding one Brigade. Estimated one battalion will suffice for defence.

D.C.N.S. 0025/18 to O.C. R.M. Faroes

And on 27 May 1940 the Royal Marines departed on S.S. Ulster Prince and having been relieved by a battalion of 637 Lovat Scouts two days previously. Accompanying the Scouts were 131 Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers. The Lovat Scouts undertook the role of defence regiment until 1942 when the 12^thBattalion Cameronian Regiment (Scottish Rifles) replaced them. The final infantry regiment to service in the Faroe Islands was the 15^th Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment who saw their withdrawal in 1944.

The arrival of the Lovat Scouts in 1940 necessitated an expansion of accommodation facilities, and soon after a party of Royal Engineers arrived with the purpose of constructing new barracks. Until then, soldiers were billeted in buildings including schools and halls rented locally. The increased demand pushed locals to increase their rents, but the threat of requisitioning powers soon brought them back to more reasonable levels. The first 50 Nissen huts arrived in the summer of 1940; and much to the irritation of the troops, they were sent without instructions nor personnel with experience in erecting them!

In November 1940 an additional 96 Scouts arrived with 252 artillerymen and engineers. Throughout 1941 the numbers of British troops in the Faroes were reported consistently at around 1,800, excluding those working on construction projects.

Notably medical support was provided by a medically qualified Army Dental Corps officer who first established a hospital in the Tórshavn convent. Casualties that couldn’t be dealt with here were evacuated to the civil hospital on the island. And in January 1941 a second medical officer arrived, accompanied by a R.A.M.C. corporal and 5 soldiers. A full field hospital in the form of 9 Field Hospital of 50 beds landed in Tórshavn in July 1940, with 4 Field Hospital landing in October moving to .

The Lovat Scouts are probably the most notable regiment that served in the Faroes, but interestingly I came across a report from the British Consulate that had a different view from that shared by most:

They lacked enthusiasm for duties not directly connected with their main purpose of defence (and) their Officers were somewhat aloof (…). (The Lovat Scouts) appeared amateur and old-fashioned and lacked enthusiasm. Faroe Islands: General Report – 1942 written by the British Consulate (National Archives ADM 116-5334 accessed from nielsjuel.fo)

As the occupation developed, ground defence of the Faroes was focussed on two main regions: Tórshavn, as a strategic harbour and headquarters of the British force on the Islands, and Vágar the site of the second Garrison and airfield. There were two defence schemes published, one covering each of these areas, and each with their own unique difficulties. 

It would have been a difficult battle should an organised invasion of the Faroes take place, but with every available man taking up arms it’s thought there could have been up to 5,000 men (all ranks, all services from the chefs to the Fortress Commander) defending the key areas of the islands. In the 1942 Emergency Scheme for the Tórshavn area written by the adjutant with the Lovat Scouts, it was summarised as such:

“The actual numbers available for defence are small. Any form of complete perimeter defence is therefore impossible. Attack may possibly come from land, sea, and air. Possible approaches inland must therefore be watched, dispersion is advisable, and a small reserve is necessary. (…) Warning of enemy action may be short (…).”

The vulnerable points around Tórshavn had been allocated a permanent military guard whose role would be to detect, deter and destroy any sabotage attempts. These were:

• Seven (1 NCO + 6) soldiers at the Cable and Wireless station
• Seven (1 NCO + 6) soldiers at the cable landing hut
• Four (1 NCO + 3) soldiers at the main quay
• Five (1 NCO + 4) soldiers at the naval weather station

Other sites such as the civilian telephone exchange, power station, oil tanks and fuel stores, explosive stores and military stores could be guarded in the event of an emergency. Notification of an emergency would come in the form of the general alarm, the codewords of which were a closely guarded secret.

General Alarm – FRANCIS: Invasion considered likely, continue to stand-to.

General Alarm – DRAKE: Take up battle positions, invasion imminent.

Each man would have been issued with 100 rounds of .303 ammunition for his rifle, 25 filled magazines for each Bren would have been shared around the Section, with 1,000 rounds of ammunition in reserve to keep the rifles and LMGs in action. Each Troop would also have had 48 hand grenades as well as a cup discharger and 17 No. 68 anti-tank rifle grenades. Any Tommy S.M.G. would have been taken although it doesn’t appear that ammunition for these were on the scale of issue.

Anti-tank troops are also likely to have been deployed as part of the army battalions on the islands. Later records included a 6-pounder gun with Staffordshire Regiment in 1943.

At Tórshavn the defence was easier to coordinate due to the concentration of troops and ability to turn the city into a defended locality as was the defensive doctrine of the time. A 3-inch mortar troop was available to be dispatched across two vehicles, manned by a corporal and 2 soldiers each, carrying 180 rounds H.E. and 60 smoke bombs per lorry.

There were also LMGs, likely Lewis Guns, in the light-AA role already deployed around the town, and the six Bofors guns around the harbour also had a ground defence role if required. When the general alarm was called, the Royal Engineers would carry out pre-planned demolitions of key sites around the town.

At Vágar however it was less favourable: “Section Commanders will ensure that the majority of troops in their sectors are mobile, only a few strong points being formed at Vulnerable Points. In each sector, volunteers will be trained for guerilla warfare, to act as self-contained units able to support themselves for several days. Volunteers to form Dynamite Squads will be formed from Technical Troops.”

Battling the elements

The airfield and flying boat base shared domestic facilities, and the difficulties of living in the new settlements on Vágar were considerable. Gusts of over 80 mph were often reported, and winters could be brutal for men in the temporary structures. Sleeping accommodation was frequently overcrowded in the early months, with 18 men sleeping in each Nissen hut; the ground condition was waterlogged, and there was no satisfactory arrangement for the disposal of sanitary waste that was simply disposed of into the sea.

There were the usual operational restrictions on consumption of alcohol in the barracks but there appeared to be an active social scene with soldiers integrating into local society. The threat of invasion was low, and while rifles and 10 rounds of ammunition were carried while on duty or in work parties, helmets and respirators weren’t required to be carried. None of this was required when the soldiers were “walking out” on a leave pass. The threat of bombing or air attack was greatest, and a black-out was enforced in all military buildings after darkness.  

It seems that February 1944 saw the most brutal of winter storms. A Nissen hut was blown into the lake, having been evacuated weeks earlier due to flowing and ice flows. Rivers choked with ice, and the Officer’s Mess (having been gutted by fire in March 1943) was flooded out. Radio aerials were downed; masts snapped in half and outstations enclosed in snow drifts. The weather extended into March when all water services on camp froze, roads were blocked by snow drifts and coal was reported as being in short supply. Emergency water was collected through holes in the ice, and the camp resorted to emergency rations until adequate resupply could be coordinated. 

Attacks on the islands

This is by no means a complete list of attacks on the islands during the war, and there were also many casualties as a result of the minefields laid in the seas surrounding the coast; many Faroese trawlers were sunk, and locals injured when mines washed ashore.

The first aerial attack is reported to have taken place on Christmas eve 1940 as a German aircraft wounded a local labourer and attacked fishing vessels.

At dusk on Friday 22 November 1940, up to two German seaplanes dropped torpedoes in Tórshavn harbour. Minor damage was caused to the hospital and other buildings.

Air attacks intensified in 1941 to an almost daily basis in the autumn, and 20 local vessels were sunk in the same year. The hospital was attacked again by a torpedo dropped by an aircraft in February 1941 and in the same year the lighthouse on Nolsoy was reportedly destroyed by an enemy bomber.

On the 21 February 1941 two Heinkel bombers sank an armed trawler, the Lincoln City, killing 8 seamen. One of the attacking aircraft was hit by Lewis-gun fire and 12-pounder fire and downed in a fjord. The occupants escaped and were arrested. 

Up to three enemy aircraft dropped bombs at Skålefjord, luckily missing their intended target of the Admiralty tanker. The Ju.88 was engaged with machine gun fire and a nearby 2-pdr. A.A. gun that reported a positive hit on one of the engines, but no record of the aircraft crashing was recorded. 

In a briefing issued by the American military, it was reported to President Roosevelt that on the 30 November 1941 slight damage occurred to Mykinnes lighthouse following an attack at midday. However, due to blackout restrictions imposed by the British, all lighthouses had been extinguished on 22 April 1940 so the effect of the bombing is likely to have been negligible. 

On the 17 December 1941 an aircraft attacked Trangisvaag and ships in Skålefjord, without injury or damage. A British fighter patrol was in the area at the time but was unable to intercept the raider due to a lack of means of ground to air communication. Recorded in the RAF Vágar Station Diary for 12 June 1943 at 10:15 was a report received from Force HQ that a submarine (presumed German, Editor) having surfaced off Oyri. The report stated that at 01:30 on 12 June, a small number of men were believed to have gone ashore at Hvalvik from the submarine. This wasn’t the only reference I uncovered about enemy landings. In fact, in the Admiralty War Diaries from 22 May 1940 record the vessel S.S. Ulster Prince had reported a possible enemy aircraft landing, but I have not yet found any further information.

Bibliography

1. National Archives, ADM 202/432 Operation VALENTINE Faroe Islands (visited February 2025)
2. National Archives, AIR 28/873 RAF Station Vágar Faroes Record Book 1942-1944 (visited February 2025)
3. National Archives, AIR 28/873 RAF Vágar Faroes Operational Log 1942 to 1944 Annexes (visited February 2025)
4. National Archives, AIR 20/2451 Defence of the Faroe Islands Part 1 (visited February 2025)
5. National Archives, WO 176/79 Composite Coast Battery Faroes War Diary 14 March to 31 March 1944 (visited February 2025)
6. National Archives, WO 166/6884 Faroe Islands X Garrison War Diaries 1942 (includes as an appendix the Vágar Garrison Standing Orders, 27 May 1942) (visited February 2025)
7. National Archives, WO 195/2 Stredur Battery Fort Record Book Faroes (visited February 2025)
8. National Archives, WO 176/77 War Diary 265 Coast Battery Faroes July 1942 (visited February 2025)
9. National Archives, AIR 20/862 Ground Defences Faroe and Northern Ireland (visited February 2025)
10. National Archives, WO 106/3019 Faroe LORAN Station (visited February 2025)
11. National Archives, WO 192/4 Skanse Fort Record Book Faroes (visited February 2025)
12. National Archives, AIR 15/160 Faroe Seaplane Anchorages (visited February 2025)
13. National Archives, WO 106/3018 Faroe Islands Emergency Scheme 22 January 1942 (visited February 2025)
14. National Archives, AIR 20/2074 Faroes and Iceland (visited February 2025)
15. https://visitfaroeislands.com/en/about-vfi/history-governance-and-economy/history-of-the-faroe-islands/operation-valentine
16. The Bellona Quarterly 2015;680(1): 96-118, British Occupation of the Faroe Islands of 1940 – 1945.
17. https://britishonlinearchives.com Weekly Naval Intelligence Summaries, 1940-1945 (although I was unable to access these due to licencing restrictions)
18. https://catalog.archives.gov Admiralty War Diaries
19. The Faroe Islands in World War 2, FWM Brief, September 2016 by Maj. Tony Barnes
20. https://nielsjuel.fo/category/krigsdagbokur/
21. https://nielsjuel.fo A valuable online resource including the authors 6-part book series on the Faroes during occupation 1940-45.
22. National Archives WO 176/337 (from https://nielsjuel.fo)
23. National Archives WO 176/84 (from https://nielsjuel.fo)
24. National Archives WO 176/85 (from https://nielsjuel.fo)
25. National Archives AIR 20/1039(from https://nielsjuel.fo)
26. National Archives AIR 20/1072 (from https://nielsjuel.fo)
27. National Archives ADM 116/5334 (from https://nielsjuel.fo)
28. Crew, Francis Albert Eley. The Army Medical Services: Campaigns. United Kingdom, H.M. Stationery Office, 1956, pp188-189 (accessed via https://books.google.com/books?id=951QAQAAIAAJ)

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  Some reports stated 250 Marines, but archive documents show just less than 200 were sent.